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Third Circuit Review
SAVING PRIVATE REMEDIES: BELL v. CHESWICK GENERATING
STATION ARMS PROPERTY OWNERS WITH A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST ENERGY COMPANIES
LISABEL CHEONG*
“[T]he rights of persons, and the rights of property are the objects for
the protection of which Government was instituted.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental rights to own and protect property are staples of the
American dream.2 However, as countless industrial facilities continue to
develop, air pollution increasingly infringes on citizens’ rights to enjoy
their private properties.3 In response to increased litigation arising from
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2011, Wake
Forest University. This Casebrief is dedicated to my family for their constant love
and support. Additionally, this Casebrief would not have been possible without the
unwavering encouragement and advice of my friends. Lastly, a special thanks to
the editors of the Villanova Law Review for their insight and suggestions during the
writing process.
1. GARRETT WARD SHELDON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES MADISON
116 (2003) (quoting James Madison, fourth President of the United States, who
asserted government was instituted to protect rights of persons and property).
2. See STEVEN EDWARD HORN, PROPERTY AND DEMOCRACY: AUTHORITY IN FOUR
AMERICAN PROPERTY-RIGHTS REGIMES 7 (2008) (“[M]odern liberals suggest that . . .
property ownership is a fundamental right . . . .”); MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 26–27 (2009) (“Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to the American citizen ‘among other things, the fundamental rights of life, liberty and property . . . .’ ”); THE CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 345 (7th ed.
2009), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/catohandbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-34.pdf (“America’s Founders understood
clearly that private property is the foundation not only of prosperity but of freedom itself. Thus, through the common law, state law, and the Constitution they
protected property rights—the rights of people to freely acquire, use, and dispose
of property.”).
3. See Jim Efstathiou, Jr., Andrew Harris & Sophia Pearson, Missouri Lawyer
Brings Nuisance Claims to Fracking Arena, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-11/missouri-lawyer-brings-nuisance-

(771)
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such pollution, energy companies have increasingly argued that federal
environmental laws preempt related state laws.4
In the context of air pollution suits, polluters argue their compliance
with comprehensive federal regulations under the Clean Air Act (CAA)
shields them from liability under state law.5 This preemption defense is
problematic in light of the limited right of recovery afforded to property
owners under the CAA.6 Under the CAA, property owners are unable to
seek damages if air pollution adversely impacts their property.7 The preservation of state common law claims is thus necessary to arm landowners
with a means to protect their property interests.8 Accordingly, an analysis
of whether the CAA preempts state common law is significant because
state common law is the primary means by which plaintiffs may seek redress from polluters.9
claims-to-fracking-arena.html (describing nuisance claims against fracking companies); see also Earl Hagström, Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation Is on the Rise, SEDGWICK
LAW (Sept. 2011), http://www.sdma.com/hydraulic-fracturing-litigation-is-on-therise-09-19-2011/ (explaining increase in fracking litigation).
4. See Third Circuit Finds Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt Toxic Tort in Pennsylvania—Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, PHILA. TOP INJURY LAWYER BLOG
(Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter CAA Does Not Preempt Toxic Tort], http://www.philadelphiatopinjurylawyerblog.com/2013/09/third-circuit-finds-clean-air.html (stating that federal preemption has “become a popular way for large, powerful entities
to try to avoid personal injury lawsuits”).
5. See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir.
2013) (stating defendant’s contention that “because the Plant was subject to comprehensive regulation under the [CAA], it owed no extra duty to the [plaintiffs]
under state tort law”).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (e) (2012) (providing right to citizen suit enforcement but no right to compensatory damages except through common law); see also
JJ England, Saving Preemption in the Clean Air Act: Climate Change, State Common Law,
and Plaintiffs Without a Remedy, 43 ENVTL. L. 701, 703 (2013) (noting that CAA
“provides no means for an aggrieved party to seek compensatory damages from a
polluter under any circumstances except through its savings clause”). Furthermore, England characterizes this CAA shortcoming as “a significant hole currently
left unaddressed by Congress.” Id. (attributing CAA’s lack of remedial measure to
Congressional silence).
7. See England, supra note 6, at 703 (recognizing that CAA does not provide
for injured property owner to seek compensatory damages from polluter, except
through savings clause). See generally Kathleen Roth, Note, A Landowners’ Remedy
Laid to Waste: State Preemption of Private Nuisance Claims Against Regulated Pollution
Sources, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 402–03 (1996) (discussing
historical significance of private nuisance claim in cases of pollution damage).
8. See Roth, supra note 7, at 401–03 (discussing importance of preserving common law claims to ensure plaintiffs are afforded mode of redress).
9. See id. at 401, 420–22 (explaining that common law has traditionally been
used to protect property owners and illustrating inadequacy of alternative remedies); see also England, supra note 6, at 703–04 (describing common law and its
ability to provide relief: “it is foundational that courts have the ability to prevent
harm from occurring through exercise of equitable powers and further ability to
provide relief to aggrieved parties through their powers at law.”); Scott Gallisdorfer, Clean Air Act Preemption of State Common Law: Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims
After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 VA. L. REV. 131, 163–65 (2013) (stating one argument
in favor of preserving common law nuisance actions: such remedies act as “flexible
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This Casebrief asserts that the Third Circuit, in a case of first impression, correctly preserved common law remedies to protect private property
interests by holding that the CAA does not preempt state common law.10
Part II of this Casebrief provides an overview of the CAA and its structure,
including the model of cooperative federalism it employs and the two savings clauses it features.11 Part III explains and evaluates the Third Circuit’s decision in Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station12 and discusses other
related circuit cases in light of Supreme Court precedent.13 Part IV analyzes the implications of the Cheswick holding for Third Circuit practitioners.14 Finally, Part V argues that the Third Circuit’s preemption ruling
properly preserves landowners’ rights to recover damages caused by air
pollution.15
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides a general overview of the CAA and the preemption issues associated with its implementation.16 First, this section discusses the mechanics of the CAA.17 Second, it explains the preemption
doctrine and the inconsistent applications various circuit courts have
adopted.18 Finally, this section examines the preemption jurisprudence
arising in the context of the CAA.19
tool for filling in the ‘gaps’ not covered by more general legislative or administrative regulation,” but ultimately concluding that it has little application to context
of climate change and that substantial costs from “gap-filling” litigation may actually be counterproductive).
10. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s adoption of the proper
approach to preemption in a CAA case, see infra notes 95–106, 151–54 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the CAA and the preemption doctrine, see
infra notes 16–84 and accompanying text.
12. 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013).
13. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis and holding in
Cheswick, see infra notes 85–138 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the practical ramifications for practitioners,
including an explanation of the ramifications of the Third Circuit’s holding, see
infra notes 139–57 and accompanying text.
15. For the argument that the Third Circuit applies a proper approach to
protect property owners’ rights to seek redress from air pollution, see infra notes
158–61 and accompanying text.
16. For a general overview of the CAA and associated issues, see infra notes
17–84 and accompanying text.
17. For a brief overview of the CAA’s structure, see infra notes 20–43 and
accompanying text.
18. For an overview of the preemption doctrine generally and its inconsistent
application, see infra notes 44–67 and accompanying text.
19. For an overview of preemption jurisprudence in the context of the CAA,
see infra notes 68–84 and accompanying text.
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A. Pollution Solution: The Clean Air Act
Air pollution recognizes neither geographical nor political boundaries; thus, a joint effort by state and federal governments is necessary to
regulate its adverse effects.20 Although the CAA is a federal law, its cooperative federalism structure and savings clauses safeguard states’ rights.21
Moreover, these distinct structural mechanisms reflect Congress’s intent
to preserve state law remedies.
1. Two Halves of a Whole: The CAA’s Cooperative Federalism Structure
The twentieth century was marked by the rise of industry and urbanization of American cities.22 Industrialization generated unprecedented
levels of air pollution and eventually spurred congressional action to protect public health.23 By 1963, Congress enacted the CAA, a comprehensive federal law that regulates air emissions and delegates its
implementation to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).24 The
CAA’s goal is “to protect . . . air resources . . . to promote the public health
and welfare . . . .”25
20. For a further discussion of the CAA’s cooperative federalism structure, see
infra notes 21–32 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the CAA’s savings clauses, see infra notes 33–43
and accompanying text.
22. See Caroline Wick, Note, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station: Preserving the
Cooperative Federalism Structure of the Clean Air Act, 27 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 109
(2013) (explaining that scientists, public, and government officials began to worry
about air pollution in 1950s and 1960s); see also FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ch. 2, § 2.03 (Matthew Bender) (explaining increasing air pollution following World War II); England, supra note 6, at 703 (describing air
pollution and climate change as causes for concern and using native village of
Kivalina for illustration).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2012) (explaining Congress’s finding “that
the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development . . . has resulted in mounting dangers to the public
health and welfare, including . . . the deterioration of property, and hazards to air
and ground transportation”); see also Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and
Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85,
90 (2001) (recounting history of environmental movement).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)–(2) (declaring that EPA retains ultimate authority over NAAQS to determine acceptable levels of emissions). Congress enacted the CAA in 1963 and amended it significantly in 1970, 1977, and 1990,
providing the EPA with even broader authority to implement and enforce regulations reducing air pollutant emissions. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88206, 77 Stat. 392; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (illustrating expansion of EPA’s authority).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (declaring purposes of CAA). The stated purposes of the CAA include:
(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as
to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of
its population;
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Under the CAA, state and local governments are responsible for pollution prevention and control, but the Act recognizes federal financial assistance and leadership as essential components to accomplishing these
objectives.26 Through this cooperative federalism structure, the federal
government develops baseline standards for states to individually implement and enforce.27 The EPA, on the other hand, is tasked with creating
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to create a uniform
level of air quality across the county.28 After establishing such standards,
the EPA delegates responsibility and authority for achieving NAAQS “attainment” to the states.29
Specifically, states are required to create and submit to the EPA a
State Implementation Plan (SIP), which details a plan for attainment,
maintenance, and enforcement of NAAQS within the state.30 As such,
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments in connection with the development and execution of their air
pollution prevention and control programs; and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of regional
air pollution prevention and control programs.
Id. § 7401(b) (listing CAA’s objectives).
26. See id. § 7401(a)(3)–(4) (recognizing federal financial support as “essential” to success of CAA).
27. See id. § 7410 (describing CAA’s implementation system); see also Bell v.
Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing CAA’s
“cooperative federalism” structure); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (describing CAA as “experiment in cooperative federalism”); England,
supra note 6, at 713–14 (explaining that “[b]ecause pollutants do not respect political boundaries,” CAA “contains several additional authorities that allow for cooperative interstate, regional, and international regulatory programs”).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (describing purpose of NAAQS). The CAA
splits the country into various “air quality control regions” to facilitate compliance
with the NAAQS. See id. § 7407(b) (describing air control regions). An air quality
control region is considered to be in “attainment” if it satisfies the NAAQS for a
given pollutant. See id. § 7409(b) (explaining when region satisfies NAAQS); see
also Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“NAAQS must
protect not only average healthy individuals, but also ‘sensitive citizens’—children, . . . people with asthma, emphysema, or other conditions rendering them
particularly vulnerable to air pollution.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 10
(1970))); England, supra note 6, at 707 (“[T]he EPA Administrator [must] add
pollutants to this list and promulgate [NAAQS] upon a finding that such pollutants ‘endanger [the] public health or welfare.’ ” (third alteration in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a))).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (explaining that air quality control region is considered to be in “attainment” if it satisfies the NAAQS for a given pollutant); see also
id. § 7410 (detailing states’ responsibilities); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1995) (discussing authority
delegated to states).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (explaining that decisions regarding how to
meet NAAQS are left to individual states). All SIPs must be submitted to the EPA
for approval, and once a SIP is approved, “its requirements become federal law
and are fully enforceable in federal court.” Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the
Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing 42

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014

5

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-5\VLR501.txt

unknown

Seq: 6

23-OCT-14

7:28

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 5 [2014], Art. 1

776

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: p. 771

states are given the freedom to set standards more stringent than those
specified by federal requirements.31 To enforce their standards, states require sources—facilities that emit pollution—to obtain a state-issued permit that limits the types and amounts of emissions that each permit holder
is allowed to discharge.32
2. The Savings Clauses
The CAA features two savings clauses that preserve the rights of citizens to bring civil actions and states to set their own emissions standards.33
First, the “citizen suit” provision permits the filing of civil suits “against any
person . . . who is alleged to have violated . . . or to be in violation of . . . an
emission standard or limitation” or “an order issued by the Administrator
or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation . . . .”34 In short,
this savings clause enables property owners to bring suit if their property is
adversely affected by air pollution.35
While the citizen suit provision authorizes private enforcement of the
CAA, its remedies are limited to injunctive relief and recovery of litigation
costs and attorney’s fees.36 Notably, the citizen suit provision does not
U.S.C. § 7604(a)) (explaining requisite steps to make SIP legally enforceable). Additionally, the states must implement a mandatory permit program that limits the
amounts and types of emissions that each stationary source is allowed to discharge.
See id. at 336 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B), (D)) (describing mandatory permit system states are required to implement). If a state declines this delegated
authority, then the CAA requires the EPA to develop a federal implementation
plan. See id. at 346 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)) (discussing circumstances that lead
to federal implementation plan).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (detailing how states retain authority); see also Int’l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494–97 (1987) (emphasizing source state law
could impose more stringent emissions rates than those required by federal regulations of Clean Water Act (CWA)); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451
U.S. 304, 328 (1981) (“Section 510 [of the CWA] clearly contemplates state authority to establish more stringent pollution limitations . . . .”).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(a), (d)(1), 7661c(a) (detailing state implemented
permit program).
33. See id. §§ 7604(a)(1), 7416 (establishing savings clauses); see also Roth,
supra note 7, at 401 (asserting that Congress resolved preemption issues “by expressing its intent to save these causes of action or to preclude them in each environmental protection statute”).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (describing citizens savings clause). The statute
allows suits against any entity that constructs a source of emissions without securing
the requisite permits. Id. § 7604(a)(3). Furthermore, the EPA can “inspect and
monitor regulated sources, to impose administrative penalties for noncompliance,
and to commence civil actions against polluters in federal court.” See Am. Elec.
Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011) (describing EPA’s
authority).
35. See Wick, supra note 22, at 111 (arguing that legislative history of citizen
suit provision illustrates Congressional intent to preserve citizens’ right to bring
actions for pollution damages under common law).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (lacking provision allowing for recovery of
damages).
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provide for recovery of damages.37 In fact, there is no provision within the
CAA that allows an individual to seek compensation for actual harm
caused by air pollution.38 Unfortunately, property owners who suffer extensive damage from air pollution find little relief by recovering litigation
costs and attorney’s fees.39
The other savings clause, entitled “Retention of State authority”
(states’ rights savings clause), focuses on the rights of states.40 The provision specifies that “nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right
of any State . . . to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control
or abatement of air pollution . . . .”41 As a result, this savings clause preserves a state’s right to impose its own standards and illustrates the CAA’s
cooperative federalism structure.42 In light of this provision, it is clear
that Congress intended the CAA to impose minimum standards for emissions—a “regulatory floor, not a ceiling” on state emissions standards.43
B. Preemption: A Constitutional Doctrine Obscured by Hazy Application
1. Preemption Generally
Preemption, a doctrine based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, holds that certain matters are of such national character that federal laws governing those matters take precedent over conflicting state
laws.44 Thus, if a state passes a law that is inconsistent with federal law, the
doctrine of preemption is triggered: federal law trumps and invalidates the
conflicting state law.45 Congressional intent, however, is the threshold inquiry for every preemption issue.46 Preemption analyses begin with the
37. See id. § 7604. For a brief overview of the CAA’s silence on damages, see
infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (lacking provision to allow for recovery of
damages).
39. See Roth, supra note 7, at 420 (explaining denial of common law nuisance
claims “will also leave individual landowners without adequate remedies for harm
caused by the polluter”).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (preserving state authority).
41. Id. (preserving states’ authority to set emissions standards).
42. See England, supra note 6, at 715 (stating legislative history of savings
clause illustrates “it was intended to preserve traditional common law claims for
pollution damages”).
43. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2013)
(concluding that federal regulations set minimum standards and states are free to
impose stricter standards).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .”).
45. See generally Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the
Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1258–61 (2010) (providing overview of preemption
doctrine); see also England, supra note 6, at 724 (illustrating supremacy clauses and
explaining in detail two types of preemption: express and implied).
46. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (asserting Congressional purpose is “‘ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case” (quoting Retail
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assumption that the states’ historic police powers are not to be preempted
by federal law absent a “clear and manifest” congressional intent.47
While the preemption doctrine appears straightforward, it has been
described as “notoriously fuzzy” in its application.48 Indeed, “if there is
any fixed principle in preemption doctrine, it is that courts will only
grudgingly read preemptive intent into a federal statute.”49 Accordingly,
Supreme Court tests for determining if state law is preempted are inconsistent and “open-ended” and therefore susceptible to varied interpretations
by district court judges.50
In 1987, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Clean Water Act
(CWA) preempted state law in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette.51 In Ouellette, a Vermont resident sued the owner of a paper mill located across
Lake Champlain in New York, alleging that the plant’s discharges were a
nuisance.52 The plaintiff brought a state common law claim under the
laws of Vermont, the affected state, despite the fact that the polluting
plant was in New York.53 The Court explained that “[a]lthough Congress
intended to dominate the field of pollution regulation, the [CWA’s] saving clause negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for state
causes of action.”54 Underscoring the importance of the savings clause,
the Court reasoned, “nothing in the [CWA] bars aggrieved individuals
from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State.”55
The Ouellette Court definitively held that the CWA did not preempt a state
common law nuisance suit, positioning its decision on the existence of the
Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (explaining evidence of congressional intent may be explicit
or implicit).
47. See Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 140–41 (“[T]he presumption against congressional intent to preempt state law has ‘particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States.’ . . . [A] court will read a
statute that is ambiguous as to preemptive intent not to invoke preemption, particularly where any preemptive effect would disrupt the traditional balance between
state and federal power.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Altria Grp. v. Good, 555
U.S. 70, 77 (2008))).
48. See England, supra note 6, at 723 (describing preemption doctrine).
49. Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 140 (describing standard of review for
preemption).
50. See England, supra note 6, at 729 (“[T]he foundation of the Court’s preemption jurisprudence is on uncertain footing.”). England attributes the uncertainty of preemption jurisprudence to the Court’s case-by-case analysis. See id. at
730–33 (providing in-depth discussion of Supreme Court’s uncertain stance on
preemption).
51. 479 U.S. 481, 483 (1987) (providing issue of case).
52. See id. at 484 (stating facts); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 822 (1979) (listing elements of nuisance claim).
53. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 483 (stating plaintiff’s claim).
54. Id. at 492.
55. Id. at 497 (concluding that CWA does not prevent plaintiffs from bringing
action under source state’s law).
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CWA’s two savings clauses that preserve a citizen’s right to bring claims
under common law or any other statute.56
Since 2000, the Supreme Court’s stance on preemption issues has
been inconsistent.57 For example, in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America,
Inc.,58 the Court held that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard,
which limits auto manufacturers’ choice of seatbelts to two options, does
not preempt state tort suits.59 On the other hand, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,60 the Court held that federal statutes and regulations promulgated
under the Food and Drug Act do preempt state laws imposing the duty to
change a drug’s label upon generic drug manufacturers.61 In Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC,62 the Court held that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act preempts all state-law design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers brought by plaintiffs seeking compensation for injury or death caused
by a vaccine’s side effects.63 The Court, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,64 issued a holding that that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a
California Supreme Court decision because it impeded “the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”65
Finally, in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting,66 the Supreme
Court established that that the Federal Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA) does not preempt Arizona’s unauthorized alien employment law because it “fits within the confines of IRCA’s savings clause
and does not conflict with federal immigration law . . . .”67
2. Preemption and the CAA
The Supreme Court first considered preemption in the context of the
CAA in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut.68 In American Electric Power
56. Id. at 500 (holding CWA does not preempt state law).
57. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 305 (2012) (noting that most
Justices “remain uncommitted” to clear positions on many issues central to preemption doctrine, with clear exception of Justice Thomas).
58. 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
59. See id. at 1136 (“Under ordinary conflict pre-emption principles a state law
that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of a federal law is pre-empted.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
60. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
61. See id. at 2579 (“The Supremacy Clause, on its face, makes federal law ‘the
supreme Law of the Land’ even absent an express statement by Congress.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)).
62. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
63. Id. at 1070–71 (providing holding).
64. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
65. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (stating holding).
66. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
67. Id. at 1987 (stating holding).
68. 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011) (stating issue of case).
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Co., the Court held that federal common law is fully displaced by the
CAA.69 The Court expressly reserved the question of whether the CAA
similarly preempts state common law claims.70 Yet, despite having issued
six preemption opinions, the Court’s stance on preemption remains
uncertain.71
Inconsistent treatment of CAA preemption has not been limited to
the Supreme Court.72 Not surprisingly, courts have struggled to rule consistently on preemption cases.73 In 1989, the Sixth Circuit held that the
CAA did not preempt plaintiffs from suing the City of Detroit under the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA).74 In Her Majesty the
Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit,75 the plaintiffs initiated a suit against the City of Detroit under the MEPA over the proposed
construction of a city-owned incinerator.76 In holding that the CAA did
not preempt the state law, the court emphasized that the CAA’s savings
clause, like those of the CWA, expressly preserves an ongoing role for the
states in regulating air pollution.77
More recently, in 2010, the Fourth Circuit held in North Carolina ex rel.
Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority78 that the CAA preempts state-law tort
claims.79 The state of North Carolina brought a state-law public nuisance
suit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency that
owned and operated coal-fired power plants in Tennessee, Alabama, and
Kentucky.80 The district court issued an injunction against four TVA
plants, which imposed emissions standards that were stricter than those
required by the CAA.81
69. Id. at 2531 (holding that CAA preempts federal common law).
70. See id. at 2540; see also England, supra note 6, at 723 (stating that district
courts faced with CAA preemption issues have arrived at different results, “spanning the entire range from full preemption to non-preemption”).
71. See England, supra note 6, at 729–30 (describing lack of Supreme Court
consistency in its 2011 preemption opinions).
72. Compare Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir.
2013) (holding CAA does not preempt state law), and Her Majesty the Queen in
Right of the Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 334 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding CAA did not preempt state law), with North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding CAA preempts state
law).
73. For cases illustrating inconsistent circuit court preemption opinions, see
infra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.
74. See Her Majesty the Queen, 874 F.2d at 342 (finding that CAA “displaces state
law only to the extent that state law is not as strict as emission limitations established in the federal statute”).
75. 874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989).
76. See id. at 333–34 (providing facts of case).
77. See id. at 342–43 (noting that plain language of CAA’s savings clause
“clearly indicates that Congress did not wish to abolish state control”).
78. 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
79. See id. at 311–12 (holding CAA preempts state tort claims).
80. See id. at 296 (providing facts of case).
81. See id. (providing facts of case).
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, noting that the district court
misapplied Ouellette, and held that the CAA preempts state law.82 Moreover, the court concluded that Ouellette’s holding regarding the CWA is applicable in a CAA action, particularly because of the striking similarities
between the two acts.83 Subsequently, in 2013, the Third Circuit was given
the opportunity to formulate its own approach to state preemption, “a
matter of first impression” for the court.84
III. BELL V. CHESWICK GENERATING STATION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
PROTECTS PROPERTY OWNERS’ RIGHTS TO SEEK REDRESS FROM
AIR POLLUTION
The Third Circuit took a decisive stance in the preemption debate by
holding that the CAA did not preempt state law.85 The unanimous ruling
had the effect of preserving state-law tort claims and with it the rights of
citizens to seek compensation for property damage caused by a facility’s
pollution.86
A. Narrative Analysis
In a matter of first impression for the Third Circuit, the Cheswick court
correctly relied on Supreme Court precedent to give full effect to the
CAA’s states rights’ savings clause.87
1. Background: Facts and Procedure
In 2012, two women led a 1,500-member class action lawsuit against
Cheswick Generating Station, GenOn Power Midwest, L.P. (GenOn), the
owner of a 570-megawatt coal-fired power plant (Plant).88 The plaintiffs
claimed that the Plant’s operation caused ash and other contaminants to
settle on their property and sought to recover compensatory and punitive
damages under three common law tort actions: nuisance, negligence and
82. See id. (rejecting lower court’s holding and stating it misapplied Supreme
Court’s Ouellette decision).
83. See id. at 306 (justifying applicability of Ouellette, despite it being CWA
case).
84. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 189–90 (3d Cir.
2013) (“[W]e are faced with a matter of first impression: whether the [CAA]
preempts state law tort claims brought by private property owners against a source
of pollution located within the state.”); see also Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 151
(emphasizing that “[r]elatively few lower courts have specifically addressed
whether the Clean Air Act preempts nuisance claims arising from state common
law”).
85. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 198 (holding plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted
by CAA).
86. See id. (explaining plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted by CAA).
87. For a further discussion of the facts, procedure, and analysis of Cheswick,
see infra notes 88–106 and accompanying text.
88. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 189 (identifying named plaintiffs in class action
complaint against defendant).
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recklessness, and trespass.89 They argued that despite GenOn’s claims of
operating within the law, the Plant was violating its permit, which prohibits
it from emitting visible, or otherwise perceptible, contaminants outside of
its own boundaries.90 In response, “GenOn argued that because the Plant
was subject to comprehensive regulation under the [CAA], it owed no extra duty to the [property owners] under state tort law.”91
Agreeing with GenOn, the district court granted its motion to dismiss
on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ tort claims “impermissibly encroach[ed] on and interfere[d] with [the federal] regulatory scheme” and
were thus preempted by the CAA.92 On appeal, the Third Circuit’s main
issue was whether the CAA preempts state-law tort claims brought by private property owners against a source of pollution located in the same
state as the property.93 Based on the plain language of the CAA’s savings
clauses and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that the CAA does
not preempt state-law tort claims.94
2. CAA Preemption Analysis
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the Plant was extensively regulated and comprehensively overseen by both state and federal authorities
under the CAA and that the facility’s permit specifically addresses odor
and combustion residuals emissions.95 Consequently, the Third Circuit
did not determine that the permit was controlling on the issue.96 Rather,
the court looked to the states’ rights savings clause within the permit itself
89. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 315 (W.D.
Pa. 2012) (detailing plaintiffs’ complaint: “property damage, the invasion by and
inhalation of . . . odors, and the deposit of . . . particulate coal dust, including fly
ash and particulates formed by gases and chemicals emitted by [the Plant]”); see
also Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 192 (listing common law tort theories under which plaintiffs sought damages). The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief on the nuisance
and trespass counts but admitted that such relief would only force GenOn to remove the debris and particulate that continuously falls upon the plaintiffs’ properties. Id. at 192–93.
90. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 191–92 (detailing specifics of GenOn’s Subchapter V permit for its Cheswick plant).
91. Id. at 189 (describing defendant’s argument).
92. Cheswick, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (ruling CAA preempted state law claims).
93. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 189–90 (identifying case as matter of first impression); cf. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490–91 (1987) (discussing different laws of affected and source states involved).
94. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 198 (“We see nothing in the [CAA] to indicate
that Congress intended to preempt source state common law tort claims. . . . We
will reverse the decision . . . .”). Contra Cheswick, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (“[T]o
permit the common law claims would be inconsistent with the dictates of the
[CAA].”).
95. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 191–92 (discussing regulation at Cheswick plant).
96. See id.
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that preserved all rights and remedies under equity, common law, and
statutory law.97
The Third Circuit, acknowledging that it was addressing preemption
in the context of the CAA for the first time, based its reasoning on the
Supreme Court’s holding in Ouellette.98 The court explained that the CAA
includes savings clauses similar to the CWA that provide the statutory basis
to preserve the plaintiffs’ state common law claims.99 Further, the court
emphasized the consistency with which other circuits have examined this
issue and failed to find any meaningful distinction between the CWA and
the CAA.100
In terms of policy considerations, the court refrained from addressing
whether its ruling would open the floodgates to nuisance claims against
facilities that may otherwise be in compliance with established state and
federal emissions standards.101 The court also did not discuss whether its
decision could result in a patchwork of inconsistent requirements.102 Instead, the Third Circuit emphasized that states have the ability to apply
more stringent standards to pollution emitting facilities located within
their jurisdiction.103 The court also approved state tort law as an acceptable means for imposing higher standards on an in-state facility.104
Lastly, the court rejected GenOn’s contention that the CAA’s comprehensive regulatory structure would be undermined if juries and courts set
97. See id. (focusing on savings clause in permit).
98. See id. at 195 (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 481).
99. See id. (comparing CWA and CAA and finding no material difference between their savings clauses and preemptive reach and thus holding that Ouellette
controlled outcome); see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S.
304, 328–29 (1981) (holding that CWA savings clauses are essentially identical to
CAA counterparts).
100. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 195–96 (discussing other circuit courts’ failure
to meaningfully distinguish between two acts and rejecting defendant’s attempt to
distinguish CWA and CAA). The Third Circuit concluded that “GenOn’s argument hinges on its expansive reading of the [CWA]’s states’ rights savings
clause. . . .” Id. at 195 (analyzing defendant’s argument).
101. See id. at 197 (lacking discussion concerning effects of holding on increased litigation).
102. See id. (acknowledging possible tension between state nuisance laws and
permit system but countering with argument that state nuisance laws are “relatively
predicable” (quoting Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498–99)); see also Roth, supra note 7, at
423 (recognizing “need to balance the interests of private citizens with industry’s
need for predictable liability”); Mark Delaquil & Richard Raile, Third Circuit Decision Finding No CAA Preemption of State Law Nuisance Creates Apparent Split with Fourth
Circuit, BAKERHOSTETLER (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.environmentallawstrategy.
com/2013/09/third-circuit-decision-finding-no-caa-preemption-of-state-law-nuisance-creates-apparent-split-with-fourth-circuit/ (“[T]he balancing of societal interests inherent in deciding nuisance claims may well preclude the certainty
necessary for regulated entities to make business investments.”).
103. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 197–98 (emphasizing that CAA’s savings clause
allows states to impose standards higher than those required by federal law).
104. See id. (concluding that state tort law is legitimate means to impose state
standards).
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emissions standards.105 The Third Circuit went on to note that the requirements of the CAA “served as a regulatory floor, not a ceiling,” and
that states remain free to impose higher standards, enforceable under
state tort law, on their own sources of pollution.106
B. Critical Analysis
The Third Circuit’s reliance on Ouellette, a case that analyzed the
CWA, shows the court’s willingness to use the Supreme Court’s analysis of
the CWA to inform its analysis of the CAA.107 On the other hand, courts
like the Fourth Circuit have failed to recognize and apply Ouellette to cases
involving the CAA.108 Ultimately, in Cheswick, the Third Circuit reserved
its judicial discretion to determine CAA preemption issues on a case-bycase basis.109
1. Sister Acts: The CWA/CAA Analogy and Supreme Court Precedent
The Cheswick court properly relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis of
preemption under the CWA in Ouellette to analyze preemption under the
CAA.110 Indeed, the similarities between the CAA and CWA have led to
the acts being called “sibling acts.”111 Both acts were passed in the 1970s,
are “command-and-control” statutes, and are seminal environmental laws
in the United States.112 Most importantly, both acts feature a cooperative
105. See id. at 197 (rejecting defendant’s argument by way of analogy: “ ‘[the]
Supreme Court addressed this precise problem’ in Ouellette . . . and rejected the
very same concerns that [defendants] now raise.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615
F.3d 291, 301 (2010))).
106. See id. at 197–98 (rejecting GenOn’s argument that court’s holding may
undermine regulatory scheme of CAA and explaining that CAA standards and requirements serve as baseline for emissions standards).
107. For a further discussion of the CWA/CAA analogy, see infra notes
110–19 and accompanying text.
108. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s approach, see infra notes
120–30 and accompanying text.
109. For a further discussion of the impact of the Cheswick decision, see infra
notes 131–38 and accompanying text.
110. See Jonathan Martel, How to Defend Air Pollution Torts After Bell v. Cheswick, LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
475613/how-to-defend-air-pollution-torts-after-bell-v-cheswick (arguing Cheswick
upholds Supreme Court precedent); see also Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 500 (1987) (holding CWA does not preempt state law); Cheswick, 734 F.3d at
198 (holding CAA does not preempt state law).
111. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from
the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 206 (1999) (noting that both acts
were “largely written by the same pivotal members of Congress”); England, supra
note 6, at 725 (describing CWA and CAA as “sibling acts”).
112. See England, supra note 6, at 726 (describing similarities between CWA
and CAA); see also Adler, supra note 111, at 206 (examining similarities and differences between CWA and CAA). Adler asserts the statutes have differed significantly in their implementation. See id. at 207 (detailing differences in
implementation methods). Command and control regulations directly regulate an
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federalism structure and delegate significant authority and discretion to
states to implement the statutes.113 Moreover, when Congress amended
the CAA in 1990, it borrowed significant ideas from the CWA.114 Therefore, the Ouellette Court’s conclusion that “nothing in the [CWA] bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the laws of
the source State” bears heavily in determining whether the CAA preempts
state laws.115
A textual comparison of the two savings clauses in the CAA and CWA
reveals that the CWA’s states’ rights savings clause includes additional language: that nothing in the CWA shall “be construed as impairing or in any
industry or activity by legislation that defines what is permitted and what is illegal,
e.g. harmful pollution. See Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law, 20
COLO. LAW. 435, 435 (1991) (describing command and control regulations). The
term “command and control” describes a regulatory structure that “impos[es]
rigid standards of conduct . . . backed up by sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such standards . . . .” Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory
Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 659 (2012) (alterations in original) (quoting James E.
Krier & Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental Law:
The Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15 n.3 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (providing early definition of term). In the
context of air pollution, command and control regulations “focus[ ] on preventing
environmental problems by specifying how a company will manage a pollutiongenerating process.” Sophia Hamilton, When Scientific Palmers Make Policy: The Impact and Future of Cap-and-Trade in the United States, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
269, 313 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing how command
and control regulations function in context of air pollution control); see also Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 152 (stating that both acts “feature nearly identical savings
clauses contemplating preservation of independent forms of state regulation,” but
also providing basis on which to distinguish two acts). The CWA’s primary savings
clause contains additional language stating that nothing in the Act should “be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters . . . of such States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012). As
Gallisdorfer points out, some commentators have suggested that the phrase “of
such States” acts as a qualifier and limits the coverage of the savings clause to a
state’s regulation of its own waters, thus driving the source and affected state law
distinction articulated by the Supreme Court in Ouellette. See Gallisdorfer, supra
note 9, at 152–53. “The [CAA], by contrast, lacks any such qualifier, perhaps indicating that this same distinction should not apply there.” Id. at 153.
113. See generally Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots
and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160–62 (1995) (providing background on federalism models employed in CWA and CAA).
114. See Adler, supra note 111, at 207–08 (illustrating close nexus between two
acts).
115. Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 194–95 (quoting Oullette, 479 U.S. at 497) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (relying heavily on Ouellette’s CWA preemption analysis
to inform its analysis); see also England, supra note 6, at 715 n.106 (arguing that
legislative history of CWA supports inference that Congress intended to preserve
traditional common law claims for pollution damages). The Senate Report for the
CWA demonstrates Congress intended for the savings clauses to “specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be
shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements
under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages.” See id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746–47.
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manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the
waters (including boundary waters) of such States.”116 The Third Circuit
explained that the CAA lacked analogous language because “there are no
such jurisdictional boundaries or rights which apply to the air.”117 The court
reasoned that, “[i]f anything, the absence of any language regarding state
boundaries” in the CAA’s states’ rights savings clause is indicative of Congress’s intent to afford more rights to the states.118 Moreover, Congress’s
“failure even to hint at” its intention to eliminate private causes of action
under state law belies any argument for preemption of state law.119
2. Parting Ways with the Fourth Circuit
The Third Circuit’s vision of preemption under the CAA, however,
differs dramatically from the Fourth Circuit’s understanding of preemption.120 In North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Fourth Circuit held that a facility’s CAA permit preempts a state nuisance
claim under North Carolina law.121 The Fourth Circuit suggested that
subjecting permittees to a state-by-state “patchwork” of ambiguous nuisance laws is incompatible with the comprehensive regulatory framework
of the CAA.122
The Fourth Circuit strategically characterized the CAA as a delicate
regulatory system carefully crafted by “decades of thought by legislative
bodies and agencies.”123 With this in mind, the court appointed itself as
the defender of the CAA against “the vagaries of public nuisance doctrine”
that threaten to “scuttle the extensive system of anti-pollution mandates
that promote clean air in this country.”124
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (preserving states’ rights and jurisdiction with respect
to waters of states); see also Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 195 (noting additional language in
CWA’s states’ rights savings clause).
117. Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 195 (providing explanation for CWA’s additional
language).
118. Id. (interpreting omitted language as indication that Congress intended
to reserve state authority).
119. Id. at 198 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Compare id. (holding CAA does not preempt state law), with North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 306 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding
CAA preempts state law).
121. See Cooper, 615 F.3d at 310–12 (holding CAA preempts North Carolina
state law).
122. See id. at 302 (asserting state specific nuisance laws are incompatible with
CAA).
123. Id. at 298 (describing efforts that created CAA).
124. Id. (explaining policy consideration in holding that CAA preempted
state law). Moreover, the court characterizes North Carolina’s suit in one short,
but poignant statement: “Litigation that amounts to ‘nothing more than a collateral attack’ on the system, however, risks results that lack both clarity and legitimacy.” Id. at 301 (quoting Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159 (4th
Cir. 1993)) (characterizing plaintiff’s argument as attack on CAA). The court
noted that “[i]t ill behooves the judiciary to set aside a congressionally sanctioned
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The Third Circuit, on the other hand, adopted a “fundamentally different” approach.125 Two practitioners have noted that the Fourth Circuit
adopted “a broader view of Ouellette’s holding, finding that nuisance law
was an ‘ill-defined omnibus tort of last resort,’ and North Carolina’s lawsuit was an attempt ‘to replace’ the carefully crafted CAA regime with nuisance law’s ‘vague and indeterminate’ standards.”126 However, the Fourth
Circuit’s shortcoming is more conspicuous: it ignores the Supreme
Court’s assertion that nothing in the CWA—the CAA’s sister act—bars injured individuals from bringing a nuisance claim under state law.127
Ultimately, the court’s holding in Cheswick is limited to the Third Circuit, and the issue is far from settled.128 Other federal courts of appeals
have not had the occasion to address whether the CAA preempts private
state-law tort claims.129 Moreover, “the Third Circuit’s opinion is subject
to discretionary appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.”130
3. Impact of Cheswick on the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit looked to the states’ rights savings clause contained
in GenOn’s permit to preserve all rights and remedies under equity, common law, and statutory law.131 As such, the decision reserves judicial discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a facility’s permit
preempts state tort claims.132 Additionally, just one month before the
Third Circuit issued its Cheswick decision, the court issued another antischeme of many years’ duration . . . that reflects the extensive application of scientific expertise . . . .” Id. (explaining policy concerns).
125. See Delaquil & Raile, supra note 102 (explaining import of Third Circuit
decision in context of liability).
126. Id. (quoting Cooper, 615 F.3d at 302) (asserting Fourth Circuit took
broader approach to Ouellette than Third Circuit).
127. See Cooper, 615 F.3d at 301–04 (discussing Ouellette but lacking any mention of its recognition that CWA does not bar state-law nuisance claims).
128. See Arthur J. Harrington, Matthew T. Kemp & Douglas M. Poland, “Federal Court Rules that Compliance with Clean Air Act Permit Does Not Preempt Private Tort
Suits over Air Emissions”, GODFREY & KAHN, S.C. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.gklaw.
com/news.cfm?action=pub_detail&publication_id=1321 (emphasizing Cheswick decision is limited to Third Circuit).
129. See id. (noting Seventh Circuit, for example, has never addressed this
state preemption issue).
130. Id. (emphasizing possibility of appeal).
131. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2013)
(focusing on savings clause in permit).
132. See Joshua L. Belcher, Third Circuit Holds “Source State” Common Law Tort
Claims Not Preempted by Federal Clean Air Act, COZEN O’CONNOR, ENERGY, ENVTL. &
UTILS. ALERT (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.cozen.com/news-resources/publications/2013/third-circuit-holds-source-state-common-law-tort-claims-not-preempted-by-federal-clean-air-act (emphasizing importance of specific language in
permits).
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polluter decision.133 In GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA,134 GenOn’s Pennsylvania facility was generating high levels of sulfur dioxide emissions that
traveled just across the Delaware River, a mere 500 feet away, to New
Jersey.135 New Jersey filed a claim with the EPA, which issued a ruling
requiring GenOn to decrease its emissions.136 GenOn argued that the
EPA’s ruling was invalid because the ruling was arbitrary and capricious
and the EPA lacked the authority to issue the ruling; however, the Third
Circuit rejected both these claims.137 Given the Third Circuit’s pattern of
issuing pro-plaintiff decisions, it appears “polluters will have a hard time
arguing their way out of their dirty business . . . .”138
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD CIRCUIT PRACTITIONERS
AFTER CHESWICK
This section explores several key points and practical implications for
practitioners as a result of Cheswick.139 First, this section explains that CAA
compliance alone will not shield polluters from liability, because Cheswick
preserves state-law tort claims.140 Second, it recommends valuable litigation tips for regulated entities.141
A. CAA Compliance Alone Will Not Shield Against Liability
The Third Circuit’s decision is significant for regulated entities because it questions the degree to which CAA compliance will shield them
against liability for state common law violations.142 In light of Cheswick,
133. See Gabriella Khorasanee, State Tort Claims Not Preempted by the Clean Air
Act, Says 3rd Cir, FINDLAW.COM (Aug. 23, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.
com/third_circuit/2013/08/state-tort-claims-not-preempted-by-the-clean-air-actsays-3rd-cir.html (illustrating that Third Circuit’s recent rulings are not favorable
for polluters).
134. 722 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2013).
135. See id. at 515–16 (providing facts of case).
136. See id. at 516 (stating details of EPA’s ruling). The CAA “allows downwind states to petition the EPA for a finding that a source in an upwind state affects
the petitioning state’s attainment or maintenance of NAAQS due to air pollution
emanating from the source in the upwind state.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b)
(2012)) (describing circumstances that allow states to petition EPA).
137. Id. at 526 (“[W]e hold that the EPA’s action of promulgating the Portland Rule was neither an abuse of discretion nor arbitrary or capricious.”).
138. Khorasanee, supra note 133 (predicting Third Circuit’s recent EPA decisions do not bode well for future polluters).
139. For a further discussion of practical implications of the Cheswick decision,
see infra notes 140–57 and accompanying text.
140. For a further discussion of what Cheswick means for companies that own
and operate pollution emitting sources, see infra notes 142–47 and accompanying
text.
141. For suggestions and litigation tips, see infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
142. See Delaquil & Raile, supra note 102 (explaining importance of Third
Circuit decision in context of liability).
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facilities with pollution-emitting sources may not shield themselves from
civil liability by simply complying with federal law.143
The Third Circuit’s assurance that its decision is unlikely to trigger
increased litigation is questionable; Cheswick allows landowners to pursue
state claims against power plants despite their compliance with state and
federal regulations.144 Commentators note that because the Third Circuit
is the first circuit to explicitly extend Ouellette to private nuisance claims
for air pollution, it may cause facilities to “become targets of a new wave of
state tort actions from newly-emboldened neighbors.”145 Of particular
note, just days after the Cheswick decision, the “prevailing plaintiffs’ attorney filed a similar suit involving a different public utility in the same federal district.”146 Moreover, increased litigation is a palpable concern given
America’s reputation as the most litigious country in the world.147
B. Litigation Tips for Regulated Entities
Owners and operators of facilities within the Third Circuit—particularly electric, oil, and gas companies—should be cognizant of the potential increase in tort actions brought under local state law.148 Regulated
entities should emphasize the significance of their “[CAA] compliance to
a favorable merits determination.”149 At the very minimum, facilities
143. See Sudhir Lay Burgaard, Third Circuit Finds the Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt State Common Law Claims, MORRIS POLICH & PURDY LLP (Oct. 7, 2013), http://
www.mpplaw.com/files/Publication/987a9ef1-88b7-4361-8cb5-f2c0f1f42045/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8e542b00-d59e-46ba-9700-f692f09b86ba/8_
Vol5_Third-Circuit-Finds%20CAA-Does-Not-Preempt%E2%80%93SLB.pdf; see also
Belcher, supra note 132 (explaining that facilities may be complying with their
permit but that it will not “insulate them against environmental challenge”). But
see Brown v. Scioto Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1159 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) (holding that compliance with pollution permit issued under comprehensive regulatory scheme barred common law nuisance actions).
144. See Rob Green, Third Circuit Holds Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt State Tort
Claims, ABNORMAL USE (Aug. 22, 2013), http://abnormaluse.com/2013/08/thirdcircuit-holds-clean-air-act-does-not-preempt-state-tort-claims.html (explaining rationale for anticipated increase in litigation).
145. Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt Property Owners’ State Law Tort Claims, Says
Third Circuit in Case of First Impression, CROWELL & MORING LLP (Sept. 23, 2013)
[hereinafter Case of First Impression], http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/All/
Clean-Air-Act-Does-Not-Preempt-Property-Owners-State-Law-Tort-Claims-SaysThird-Circuit-in-Case-of-First-Impression; see also Green, supra note 144 (discussing
possibility of increased litigation resulting from Cheswick).
146. Case of First Impression, supra note 145.
147. See Paul H. Rubin, More Money into Bad Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2010,
4:44 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-insomeone-elses-lawsuit/more-money-into-bad-suits (“The United States is already
the most litigious society in the world. . . . [It] spend[s] about 2.2 percent of gross
domestic product, roughly $310 billion a year . . . on tort litigation, much higher
than any other country.”).
148. See Belcher, supra note 132 (warning owners of pollution-emitting facilities to be aware of possible increase in litigation).
149. Martel, supra note 110 (noting importance of CAA compliance).
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should negotiate their permits to include language that acknowledges the
CAA permit shield provision, in order to protect from additional requirements where the facility is in compliance with permitted limits.150
The Cheswick ruling abolished the defense that CAA regulation and
compliance shield facilities from incurring liability under state law.151 Despite the decision, however, other preemption-related defenses are available.152 For example, facilities could argue that state laws that regulate air
emissions preempt common law tort claims, such as nuisance.153 Additionally, defendants may assert “fact-specific administrative law arguments,
such as the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust available administrative review
remedies for seeking more stringent emission limitations in the underlying permit.”154
Public relations efforts are also critical to proactively preventing an
onslaught of litigation.155 Specifically, permit holders should consider
strategies for reaching out to landowners in the vicinity of emissions-releasing facilities, because those owners are most likely to be impacted by emissions and therefore most likely to bring future tort claims.156 Reaching
out to potential plaintiffs and resolving issues out of court may prevent
costly litigation, for both parties.157
V. CONCLUSION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH APPROPRIATELY
PROTECTS PROPERTY OWNERS’ RIGHTS TO SEEK REDRESS
Considering that common law claims have traditionally been the
means to address legislative shortcomings, the Third Circuit’s approach in
Cheswick appropriately takes steps to preserve property owners’ rights to
recover damages caused by air pollution.158 If the Third Circuit had upheld the district court’s preemption finding, then it would have effectively
barred attempts by property owners to assert their common law rights.159
One commentator notes that allowing defendants in CAA actions to in150. Belcher, supra note 132 (explaining what companies should negotiate in
permit).
151. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2013)
(remanding case for further proceedings).
152. See Harrington, Kemp & Poland, supra note 128 (discussing importance
of public relations as well).
153. See id. (suggesting alternative defense).
154. Id. (suggesting administrative law arguments for defense).
155. See id. (describing importance of public relations efforts).
156. See id. (discussing target audience for public relations efforts).
157. See id. (suggesting reaching out to potential plaintiffs).
158. See England, supra note 6, at 746 (explaining negative effect of allowing
federal laws to preempt state laws).
159. See CAA Does Not Preempt Toxic Tort, supra note 4 (explaining significance
of Third Circuit’s holding); see also Roth, supra note 7, at 404–07 (discussing permit shield provisions). Roth asserts that permit-shield provisions restrict individuals’ rights to protect their property interests and “create a gap in the scheme for
environmental protection and unnecessarily harm private landowners.” Id. at 415
(discussing impact of permit-shield provisions).
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voke a preemption defense “may deprive plaintiffs of a remedy needed to
right a wrong, and it may further erode centuries-old precedent allowing
common law air pollution claims involving traditional air pollutants to
move forward—claims expressly preserved by CAA.”160 In sum, the Third
Circuit correctly held that the CAA does not preempt state common law
actions, because its decision preserves the historic federal-state partnership that addresses “one of the most notorious types of public nuisance in
modern experience.”161
160. England, supra note 6, at 746 (explaining potential effect of upholding
defendant’s preemption defense).
161. Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (describing
air pollution). For the argument that the Third Circuit applies the proper approach to protect property owners’ rights to seek redress from air pollution, see
supra notes 110–19 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014

21

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-5\VLR501.txt

unknown

Seq: 22

23-OCT-14

7:28

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 5 [2014], Art. 1

792

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss5/1

[Vol. 59: p. 771

22

